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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
IMPORTANT CASES DECIDED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF KENTUCKY.
Marksberry v. Weir.
(Decided January 19, 1917.)
Appeal from Daviess Circuit Court.
1. Libel and Slander-Words Actionable.-Where the plaintiff
was employed at a salary of $100.00 a month as a tobacco "grader"
for the Green River Tobacco Growers' Association, which was selling tobacco to the American Tobacco Company, and the defendant
stated to third persons that the plaintiff was, at the same time, receiving a salary of $150.00 per month from the American Tobacco
Company, thus representing both the buyer and seller in the transaction, the words actionable per se, since they imputed the unfitness of
the plaintiff to perform the duties of his employment, and prejudiced him in his profession.
2. Libel and Slander-Evidence in Mitigation of Damages.Evidence of the previous existence of the slanderous report concerning the plaintiff, though not amounting to a justification of the
defena1ant, was admissible in mitigation of damages.
3. Libel and Slander-Evidence of the previous existence of
slanderous reports concerning the plaintiff is admissible under the
general issue, because it would tend to negative the charge of malice
and define the extent of actual damages done to the plaintiff by the
defendant.
4. Libel and Slander-Evidence in Mitigation of Damages.Evidence of the previous existence of slanderous reports concerning
the plaintiff, though not amounting to a justification of the defendant, is admissible in mitigation of damages generally, and it is
error for the court to restrict such evidence to a mitigation of punitive damages only.
5. Libel and Slander-Malice-Instructions.-Where the words
declared upon are slanderous per se, it is error for the instructions
to require a showing of malice upon the part of the defendant in
order for the plaintiff to recover damages.
6. Libel and Slander-Words Actionable--Duty of Jury.-
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Where slanderous words are actionable per se, the court should not
leave it to the jury to say what the defendant meant by making the
charge, since the jury's only duty, in that respect, was to say
whether the defendant made the charge. The absence of actual intent to injure furnishes no legal excuse.
W. T. Ellis, J. J. Sweeney and Little & Slack for appellant.
La Vega Clements, Louis I. Igleheart and Clements & Clements
for appellee.
Opinion of the Court by Judge Miller-Reversing.
Ray v. Shemwell.
(Decided February 16, 1917.)
Appeal from Graves Circuit Court.
1. Trial-Pleading-Demurrer.-It is not error to overrule
a demurrer to an answer as a whole, *here it contains a valid defense to any cause of action in the petition, though it may contain
averments in attempt to set up another defense, which are insufficient to state a defense to anything plead in the petition.
2. Libel and Slander--Justification and Iitigation-Pleading.
-If a defendant, in an action for slander, admits the speaking of
the words charged, and attempts to plead their truth in justification
bf his speaking them, it is not necessary that he should admit the
precise words alleged, but he must admit the speaking of the substance of the words, alleged, or at least so much of them as will sustain an action for slander, and upon such admission he may then
justify the speaking upon the ground of their truth.
3. Libel and Slander-Justification and Mtigation-Evidence.
-Where the truth of the charge is plead as a justification in an action for slander, if the charge is a specific one, the mere averment
of its truth is sufficient, but if the charge is general in its nature,
the pleading in justification, to be sufficient, must aver the acts
which constitute the offense of which the plaintiff is guilty, in order
to give him notice of what he will-be accused, and an opportunity
to meet the charge upon the trial with evidence.
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4. Larceny-False Pretenses-Distinction Between Larceny
and False Pretenses.-If the olvner of personal property is induced
by fraud to part with the possession of it, but still means and intends to retain the right of property in it, but merely intends to
part with the possession, and the one receiving it, at the time, has
a fraudulent intention to steal it, and converts it to his own use, it
is larceny, but if the owner intends to part, not only with the
possession, but with the right of property, the offense is not larceny,
but the obtention of goods by false pretenses.
Stanfield & Stanfield for appellant.
Webb & Weaks for appellee.
Opinion of the Court by Judge Hurt-Reversing.
Sowders v: Gingell, et al.
(Decided February 20, 1917.)
Appeal from Henderson Circuit Court.
1. Bills and Notes-Maturity of Installments.-The maturity
of a series of installments composing one entire debt may be accelerated upon the failure to pay any one of them, or past due interest
on them, by agreement of the parties contained either in the notes
evidencing the payments of a mortgage or debt securing them.
2. Bills and Notes-Default in Payment-Maturity of Installinents.-G. executed a deed to S. for a tract of land, a part of this
consideration for which was four notes for $500.00 each, and in the
deed it was provided that all of the notes should become due upon
the default of payment oF either of them, or the interest on them,
which was payable annually. Held, that upon default of payment of
past due interest, as provided in the deed, G. could maintain his suit
for the recovery of the entire debt and the enforcement of -his retained lien.
3. Contracts-Consideration-Sufficiency.-A mere proposal to
pay past due interest, without the tendering of the amount, and
without consideration, will not support a promise to defer the collection of the interest.
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4. Judgment-Clerical Misprision-Review.-Where a judgment is rendered for more than the correct amount as shown by
the pleadings, it is a clerical misprision and should be corrected by
motion made in the trial court, and cannot be reviewed by the
Court of Appeals without the motion having been made.
5. Frauds, Statute of-Compromise and Settlement.-A compromise of differences between plaintiff and defendant involving
the sale of land cannot be effectual as such when the compromise is
in parol only, as its terms cannot be enforced because within the
statute of frauds.
Dorsey & Dorsey for appellant.
Woodward & Dixon for appellee.
Harvey v. Rogers.
(Decided February 20, 1917.)
Appeal from Woodford Circuit Court.
1. Appeal and Error-Res Judicata.-The decision of this court
upon a question properly submitted to it for determination upon
a former appeal, is, on a subsequent appeal in the same case, res
judicata.
2. Appeal and Error-Res Judicata-Obiter.-Where upon an
appeal there are two propositions relied upon to sustain the judgment of the lower court, both are before this court for determination,
and the conclusions of the court on both of them are, upon a second
appeal in the same case, res judicata, and the fact that the courts'
conclusions upon either of the propositions were sufficient to sustain the judgment of the court upon the former appeal will not
authorize the rejection of the other as obiter dictum.
3. Guaranty-Parties.-W. and B. each purchased a certain
amount of stock in a company, and took from the promoters, a
written guaranty,. in substance, that in the purchase they should
suffer no loss, and the guarantors would indemnify them for any
loss that should occur, and to the extent of the amount paid by
each for the stock, they would make good any loss or damage arising
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out of the transaction; held, that this was a several obligation as to
each of the obligees, and in an action by the assignee of one the
other was not a necessary party.
4. Guaranty-Pleading-Amendments.-In a suit upon such
guaranty the plaintiff alleged that the stock was worthless upon
the date of issue and at all times thereafter, which allegation was
denied by defendant; held, that under section 134 of the Civil Code
of Practice, it was not error for the court to permit an amendment
to the effect that the insolvency of the company occurred three
years after the purchase of the stock, there being no evidence that
it occurred at an earlier date than that set up in the amendment.
D. L. Thornton & A. J. Carroll for appellant.
Wallace & Harris for appellees.
Western Union Telegraph Company v. Lee.
(Decided February 23, 1917.)
Appeal from Graves Circuit Court.
1. Commerce-Regulation.-In regard to those matters relating
to commerce which are not of a nature to be affected by locality, but
which necessarily ought to be the same over the whole country, the
silence of Congress upon such subject, over which it had jurisdiction, is equivalent to a declaration that in those respects commerce
should be free and unregulated by any statutory enactments.
2. Commerce-Regulation-Police Power.--It is not every
state law which may incidentally affect interstate commerce and the
persons engaged in it, that necessarily constitutes a regulation of
commerce within the meaning of the federal constitution. Legislation which is a mere aid to interstate commerce may be enacted by
a state, although at the same time it may incidentally affect that
commerce, since this is a legitimate exercise, by the state, of its police
power.
3. Commerce-Telegraphs and Telephones-Messages.-Telegraph lines extending through different states, are instruments of
commerce which are protected by the commerce clause of the
federal constitution; and, messages passing over such lines from one
state to the other, constitute a portion of commerce itself.
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4. Telegraphs and Telephones-Interstate Messages-Failure
to Deliver-Penalties.-In the absence of legislation by Congress
taking possession of the field of commerce covered by interstate
telegraph messages, the states can lawfully provide penalties and
a recovery in damages for the negligent failure of a telegraph company to deliver an interstate message.
5. Telegraphs and Telephones--Intexstate Commerce By.-By
the act of Congress approved June 18, 1910 (36 St. Lar, 544, Fed.
Sts. Ann. Suppl. 1912, p. 112), Congress took possession of the entire
field of interstate commerce by telegraph, and all state laws upon
the subject were thereby superseded.
6. Telegraphs and Telephones-Interstate Business-Regulation.-Since the passage of the act of Congress of June 18, 1910
(36 St. Lar. 544, Fed. Sts. Ann. Suppl. 1912, p. 112), superseding
state laws upon the subject of interstate commerce by telegraph
the states are without authority to regulate telegraph business of
an interstate character, in any manner.
7. Telegraphs and Telephones-Interstate Messages-Classification.-Under the act of Congress of June 18, 1910 (36 St. Lar.
544, Fed. Sts. Ann. Suppl. 1912, p. 112), telegraph companies may
classify interstate messages into day, night, repeated, unrepeated,
letter, commercial, press, government, and such other classes as are
just and reasonable, and may charge different rates for the different
classes.
8. Telegraphs and Telephones-Negligence-Limiting Liability
for by Contract.--Since the passage of the Act of Congress of
June 18, 1910 (36 St. Lar. 544, Fed. Sts. Ann. Suppl. 1912, p. 112),
a telegraph company may, by contract, limit its liability for negligence in failing to deliver an unrepeated interstate message.
9. Telegraphs and Telephones--Interstate Mssage.-A telegraph message sent from Lebanon, Ky., to Mayfield, Ky., but which
was relayed through Nashville, Tenn. en route, was an interstate
message.
Robbins & Robbins, Richards & Harris and Albert T. Benedict
for appellant.
Lafe S. Pence, H. W. Rives and Stanfield and Stanfield for appellee.
Opinion of the Court by Judge Miller-Reversing.
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